SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

An Interdisciplinary Approach to White-collar Crime in the Food Sector

Brandes, Wilhelm.

In this farewell lecture some concepts important for (agricultural) economics are discussed. Special emphasis is given to the Invisible Hand of Adam Smith, sunk costs, information economics, path dependency, error tolerance and redundancy. It is proposed that agricultural economists follow closely new developments in economics proper.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Equilibrium; Sunk costs; Game theory; Opportunism; Rationality; Path dependency; Error tolerance; Social rate of discount; Agricultural and Food Policy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99010

Hirschauer, Norbert; Musshoff, Oliver; Scheerer, Sebastian.

The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of purchased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through opportunistic behaviour. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers' social contexts - such as values, emotional bonds etc. - that shield them from yielding to economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which combines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theories). The approach is discussed with...

CAP Direct Payments and Distributional Conflicts Over Rented Land within Corporate Farms in the New Member States

Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Behavioural food risks; Control theories; Game theory; Moral hazard; Opportunistic malpractice; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; K32; K42.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25688

Latruffe, Laure; Davidova, Sophia.

This paper aims to investigate whether distributional issues within corporate farms in the New Member States will be exacerbated by the introduction of the CAP direct payments. The paper focuses on the specific impact of the payments on the land rented to the corporate farms by private landowners. If the latter are not satisfied with the level of rent they receive, they have the option to end their rental contract and withdraw their land from the farm. Before the accession to the EU the landowners did not have strong incentives to withdraw, as the other available opportunities were not associated with higher returns on land ownership. However, this situation might change as the landowners can now cash the direct payments themselves, providing they keep...

Climate Change and Game Theory

Palavras-chave: CAP direct payments; Corporate farms; Distributional conflicts; Game theory; Landowners; Agricultural and Food Policy; Land Economics/Use.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25242

Econometric analysis of imperfect competition and implications for trade research

Wood, Peter John.

This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games where players make decisions about treaty ratification, are examined. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Climate change negotiations; Game theory; Implementation theory; Coalition formation; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95061

Perloff, Jeffrey M..

Effects of category management on producer-retailer relationships

Palavras-chave: Commerce; Commercial policy; Game theory; Marketing; International Relations/Trade.

Ano: 1991

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47252

Hovelaque, Vincent; Soler, Louis-Georges; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim.

The relationships between retailers and producers are considered for understanding the determinants of quality, variety and prices. In the food sector, some issues have been extensively studied: impacts of private labels, supply contracts, price transmission. Despite an increasing role, the implementation of “Category management” (CM) has been less studied. CM belongs to a set of methods based on the concepts of Efficient Consumer Response and Supply Chain Management which have been widely implemented by large retailers and thus have changed the relationships among actors in the food chain. As a part of this evolution, Category Captain’s concept (CC) involves a commitment between a retailer and one of the suppliers who receives decision-making power over...

Emission Permits Trade of Carbon Based on the Game Theory of Double Auction

Palavras-chave: Category captain; Shelf space allocation; Game theory; Stackelberg equilibrium.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58029

Enlargement of the European Union: A movement towards the optimal trade bloc size?

Liu, Na; He, Jixin; Hou, Ning; Gu, Kaiping.

As the world's largest carbon resources country with relatively great carbon emission, China in has just started its carbon trade. China is only a passive participant in international carbon trading market, rarely participating in the project of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Therefore, trade market of emission permits can be divided into first and second trade markets. During the definition of emission right, we found out that the ways of emission trade at second carbon trade market is the key to the research on carbon trade, which can realize the allocation efficiency and utilization efficiency of resources. Then, feasibility of implementing auction system of emission permits trade in China is analyzed from the aspects of legal protection, technical...

Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation

Palavras-chave: Carbon emission permits; Game theory; Nash Equilibrium; Allocation efficiency; China; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56347

Enlargement of Trade Blocs: National Welfare Effects If Trade Is Liberalized

Glebe, Thilo W..

This paper analyses how the enlargement of a trade bloc will affect national welfare. We establish a partial equilibrium model of a trade bloc either operating as a monopoly with a competitive fringe or facing a duopolistic game in production taxes/subsidies. Given this framework, we demonstrate how member countries’ welfare effects depend on their trade flow and the market power of the trade bloc. A numerical estimation of the effects of EU enlargement on the major grain crop markets suggests that welfare effects are negligible. Economic reasons are therefore unlikely to be a motivating force for further enlargement.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalisation; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D42; F11; Q17; Q18.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58061

Glebe, Thilo W.; Salhofer, Klaus.

Small countries may benefit from the formation of a trade bloc, since their combined market power will enable them to manipulate the terms of trade. The question of interest is whether countries will benefit from the enlargement of a trading bloc, if trade liberalization induces countries to substitute domestic support measures for conventional border protection. The paper deals with this question by analyzing the conditions for positive welfare effects resulting from the enlargement of a trade bloc. Based on a partial equilibrium trade model, we consider a game in production taxes/subsidies between two trade blocs. The tax/subsidy instrument may capture the production effect which can be induced by a combination of environmental, health or safety rules....

Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality

Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalization; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D6; F11; Q17; C7.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25529

Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak; Salerno, Gillian.

In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.

Evaluation, scénarios et viabilité écologique et économique des pêcheries côtières tropicales : application au cas de la Guyane Française

Palavras-chave: Game theory; Public choice; Imperfect public monitoring; Imperfect private monitoring; Non-point source pollution; Agricultural extension; Public education; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10391

ArchiMer

Cisse, Abdoul.

The need for an integrated approach to fisheries is now widely affirmed, including the FAO, in particular in the context of tropical artisanal fisheries. These small-scale fisheries, often multispecies are very important in terms of production, employment and food security. However these fisheries and the exploited resources are often characterized by a lack of data making difficult their management within an ecosystem approach, and by the ecological and economic system complexities including trophic and technological interactions. This thesis aims to contribute to the development of bioeconomic tools for small tropical fisheries in a sustainable management perspective based on the ecosystem approach. In this perspective, the French Guiana coastal fishery...

Tipo: Text

Palavras-chave: Pêcherie tropicale à petite échelle; Multi-flottilles; Multispécifique; Approche ecosystémique; Analyse multivariée; Intéractions trophiques; Modélisation bioéconomique; Indicateurs bioéconomiques; Analyse de viabilité; Stochasticité; Théorie des jeux.; Tropical small-scale fishery; Multi-fleet; Multi-species; Ecosystem approach; Multivariate analysis; Trophic interactions; Bioeconomic modeling; Bio-indicators; Sustainability analysis; Stochasticity; Game theory.

Ano: 2013

URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00144/25492/23646.pdf

Innovation systems perspectives on developing-country agriculture: a critical review

Spielman, David J..

Published as Spielman, David J. 2006. A critique of innovation systems perspectives on agricultural research in developing countries. Innovation Strategy Today 2(1): 41-54. Ithaca, NY: bioDevelopments International Institute.; Published as Spielman, David J. 2006. Systems of innovation: models, methods, and future directions. Innovation Strategy Today 2(1): 55-66. Ithaca, NY: bioDevelopments International Institute.

Introduction to game-theory calculations

Palavras-chave: Innovation; Agricultural research; Technological innovation; Cooperation; Networks; Game theory; International Development.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59692

Orsini, Nicola; Rizzuto, Debora; Nante, Nicola.

Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision makers (Myerson 1991). Game-theory concepts apply in economy, sociology, biology, and health care, and whenever the actions of several agents (individuals, groups, or any combination of these) are interdependent. We present a new command gamet to represent the extensive form (game tree) and the strategic form (payoff matrix) of a noncooperative game and to identify the solution of a nonzero and zero-sum game through dominant and dominated strategies, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and Nash equilibrium in pure and fully mixed strategies. Further, gamet can identify the solution of a zero-sum game through maximin...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Payoff matrix; Zero-sum game; Game tree; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117525

Knowledge about a Species' Conservation Status and Funding for its Preservation: Analysis

Tisdell, Clement A..

Using a species’ population to measure its conservation status, this note explores how an increase in knowledge about this status would change the public’s willingness to donate funds for its conservation. This is done on the basis that the relationship between the level of donations and a species’ conservation status satisfies stated general mathematical properties. This level of donation increases, on average, with greater knowledge of a species’ conservation status if it is endangered, but falls if it is secure. Game theory and other theory is used to show how exaggerating the degree of endangerment of a species can be counterproductive for conservation.

Knowledge about a Species' Conservation Status and Funding for its Preservation: Analysis

Palavras-chave: Conservation campaigns; Conservation funding; Conservation status; Flagship species; Game theory; Prisoners’ dilemma; Threatened species; Value of information.; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55065

Tisdell, Clement A..

Modelling the impact of private quality standards on the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains in developing countries

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55088

Fontaine, Damien; Gaspart, Frederic; Frahan, Bruno Henry de.

Stricter quality requirements and greater uses of private quality standards have a considerable impact on the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chain in developing countries. In particular, the future of small-scale production is in doubt. This paper presents a theoretical game theory model to study the impact of quality requirements on producer and consumer welfare within certified supply chains. The model shows that total producer welfare is maximized at higher quality levels where farmers who are efficient in the production of quality products participate, whilst less efficient producers are excluded. In addition, the model provides useful insights on welfare and poverty impact of increased competition and changes in private standard certification costs.

Modelo Principal-Agente para contratos entre pequenos produtores e empresa exportadora de manga no Rio Grande do Norte

Palavras-chave: Fruit and vegetables; Private quality standards; Game theory; Crop Production/Industries.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44378

Sampaio, Luciano Menezes Bezerra.

Fruit production is an activity of great importance in the Brazilian commercial balance and even more in the Northeastern region. Intermediation is a regular practice in the fruit exporting market due to existence of requirements, such as quality certificates, and of internal problems in production and commercialization, such as credit limitations and absence of product standardization. Large companies, cooperatives, associations and NGOs receive products from many small producers and export them together with their own products. In Northeast, it is common that the exporting agent offers contracts to producers that include technical, administrative and legal assistance plus input supply. This paper proposes a model, using the principal-agent approach of...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Game theory; Small producers; Irrigated fruit production; Exportation; Agribusiness; Q10; Q12; D86.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61921

OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF A U.S./CANADIAN WHEAT POOL: A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS

Nganje, William E.; Koo, Won W.; Park, Joon J.; Taylor, Richard D..

The problem of declining wheat prices and excess supply has been the subject of recent economic studies partly because it coincides with the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, and partly because efforts to decrease supply domestically have led to increased imports from Canada. This paper develops a game theory optimization model of market efficiency and derives conditions under which voluntary pooling is sustained for U.S./Canadian durum and hard red spring wheat producers. Analysis reveals that U.S. and Canadian farmers can increase farm returns with efficiency gains from pooling and by internalizing benefits from grain blending and logistics. The model is used to analyze diverse factors affecting the sustainability of such...

Politically Acceptable Trade Compromises Between The EC and The US: A Game Theory Approach

Palavras-chave: Voluntary pooling; Game theory; Efficiency gains; Durum and HRS wheat marketing; Crop Production/Industries; Marketing.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23661

Johnson, Martin; Mahe, Louis Adrien Pascal; Roe, Terry L..

A model is developed to quantify the special status of agriculture in the US and the EC trade negotiations. The role of special interests are measured by a policy goals function (PGF) whose weights are estimated for each special interest group. The analysis searches for mutually acceptable, mutually advantageous trade agreements between the US and the EC using a partial equilibrium world trade model coupled with game theory. Results suggest that it is in the best interest of the US (resp. EC) 'for the EC (resp. US) to liberalize whi1e the other follows the status quo policies of 1986. Mutual gains in PGF values to both countries pursuing "large" liberalizations are unlikely to exist, although "small" liberalizations may give rise to "small" mutual gains....

Price and Product-Line Rivalry Among Supermarket Retailers

Palavras-chave: Game theory; Trade liberalization; Trade negotiations; International Relations/Trade.

Ano: 1990

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51154

Richards, Timothy J..

Product-line length, or variety, is a key competitive tool used by retailers to differentiate themselves from rivals. Theoretical models of price and variety competition suggest that both store and product heterogeneity are key determinants of price and variety strategies, but none test this hypothesis in a rigorous way. This study provides the first empirical evidence on supermarket retailers' combined price and variety strategies using a nested CES modeling framework. Unlike other discrete-choice models of product differentiation, the NCES model is sufficiently general to admit both corner and interior solutions in both store and product choice. The model is estimated using store-level scanner data for all grocery chains in a major West Coast market and...